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DEFAMATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
PROTECTING SPEECH ON PUBLIC ISSUES
The common law of defamation collided with the United States Consti-
tution in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, I and aftershocks from that col-
lision have been rumbling for sixteen years. Ever since the New York
Times Court asserted that the first and fourteenth amendments impose re-
straints on a state's power to afford a civil remedy for wrongful injury to
reputation, 2 the Supreme Court has been torn between its concern for
personal reputation and its competing concern for free expression. 3 The
difficulty of resolving the conflict between these two concerns has forced
the Court to decide a long line of cases4 in an attempt to define precisely
how the Constitution limits defamation actions.
After discussing the leading cases in that line, this comment proposes
an analytical method for deciding when balancing-a frequently used and
controversial technique in free speech cases 5-is an inappropriate means
for formulating a constitutional rule. Speech on public issues, being nec-
essary for a self-governing democracy, is at the core of the first amend-
ment. When such speech is at issue, the Court should not balance the
value of speech against competing social values. In Gertz v. Robert
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Id. at 283. The question whether defamatory speech could be within the scope of first amend-
ment protection had not been decided by the Court prior to New York Times. Dicta in earlier cases
stated that defamatory speech was outside first amendment protection. See notes I I & 12 infra.
3. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
4. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
111 (1979); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279
(1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Greenbelt Coop. Publ. Ass'n v. Bresler,
398 U.S. 6 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 757 (1968); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v.
Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Curtis Publ. Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S.
75 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
5. Among the law review articles discussing the use of balancing methodology in first amend-
ment cases are: Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1500-02 (1975); Emerson, First Amendment
Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 442, 447-58 (1980); Frantz, The First Amend-
ment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Chang-
ing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1001 (1972); Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr.
Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 428 (1967); Meiklejohn, The Balancing
of Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 4 (1961); Nimmer, The Right to
Speakfrom Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56
CALIF. L. REv. 935 (1968).
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Welch, Inc., 6 for example, the Court should not have balanced the private
individual's interest in recovering compensation for injury to his reputa-
tion against the public's interest in free political discussion. As a result of
this balancing, the Gertz Court formulated rules which unduly limit the
right to speak and to hear about public issues. Specifically, the Gertz rules
make substantial constitutional protection dependent on whether the
plaintiff in a subsequent defamation suit is a public official or a private
figure. Thus, the rules fail to protect a speaker from defamation liability
for speech on public issues that implicates a private individual. This fail-
ure is exemplified in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,7 in which Senator Prox-
mire's criticism of wasteful government spending subjected him to defa-
mation liability. This comment concludes that the Constitution should
provide absolute protection for speech at the core of the first amendment,
speech necessary for self-government, and that the New York Times privi-
lege 8 should extend to such speech.
I. A PURPOSIVE ANALYSIS 9 OF THE FREE SPEECH
CLAUSE-THE NEW YORK TIMES CASE
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 10 the Supreme Court interpreted
the first amendment to include a libelous publication within the protective
shelter of the free speech and free press clauses. 1' It was the first time the
Court had addressed the question whether the Constitution limits a state's
6. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
7. 443 U.S. 111 (1979). See notes 75-92 and accompanying text infra.
8. The New York Times privilege protects a speaker from tort or criminal liability. If applicable.
it requires the plaintiff or prosecutor to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
knew the alleged defamatory statement was false or that he recklessly disregarded its falsity-'ac-
tual malice." See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)(invasion of privacy), Garrison v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)(criminal libel); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80,
285-86 (1964)(libel).
"Actual malice" is an unfortunate misnomer, because "malice" in the ordinary sense of ill will or
intent to injure is not sufficient to defeat the privilege. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 821 (4th ed. 1971).
9. A purposive analysis is one which looks primarily to the purpose of the constitutional provi-
sion, statute, or common law rule as the guide to interpretation and application.
10. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court reversed a half million dollar libel judgment obtained
against the Times and four civil rights leaders in an Alabama court. The civil rights leaders had
placed an advertisement in the Times which both protested anti-civil-rights actions of Southern offi-
cials and solicited financial support. To protect public debate from the chill of defamation liability,
the Court extended the scope of the free speech clause and recognized a privilege to criticize public
officials.
1I. Libel had been listed with obscenity and "fighting" words as examples of speech outside the
scope of first amendment protection on the ground that such speech inflicts injury and is not essential
to the exposition of ideas. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)(dictum). Ac-
cord, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952)(dictum).
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power to compensate individuals injured by defamatory falsehoods. 12
The decision was prompted by the Court's perception that the threat of
defamation liability can constrict the free flow of fact and opinion' 3 which
the free expression clauses were "fashioned to assure. ' ' 14 The Court's
thesis was that a central meaning of the first amendment is to restrain
government from exercising its power in a way that hinders political dis-
cussion. 15 As authority for its interpretation of the first amendment, the
Court looked not just to the text but also to the history and the purpose of
the free speech and free press guarantees. 16 The New York Times Court
followed a school of thought that views free speech as an interest inhering
in the public acting as a political community. 17
12. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256. Two reasons may explain why the Court
had never before considered the question whether the first amendment limits a state cause of action
for defamation. First, it has only been since 1925 that the Supreme Court has said that the first
amendment is binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Second, strong dicta in Chaplinsky and Beauharnais probably discouraged
counsel from appealing libel actions on first amendment grounds. See note 11 supra.
13. 376U.S. at277-78.
14. Id. at269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957)).
15. Id. at 269-77. Although by its terms the first amendment restricts only Congress from
abridging free expression, the New York Times Court made explicit that, since the first amendment
has been applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, the states are also restricted from
abridging free expression. The constitutional prohibition applies without regard to whether the law
was enacted by the legislature or merely enforced as part of the common law by the judiciary. Id. at
278.
16. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1, 15 (1965)("[T]he Court examined history to discern the central meaning of the first
amendment.").
Interpretation that strays from the text is often quite proper in constitutional cases. Justice Holmes
said that the significance of constitutional provisions "is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not
simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their
growth." Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914). This is especially true of the first
amendment. "The language of the First Amendment is to be read not as barren words found in a
dictionary but as symbols of historic experience illumined by the presuppositions of those who em-
ployed them." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,523 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
17. Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philoso-
pher, 28 RUrGERS L. REV. 41, 42 (1974).
The first amendment protects more than just political speech; it not only serves to ensure that
government will not restrict information and opinion of political value to the public, but also serves to
protect self-expression as a desirable end in itself. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375-76 (1927)(Brandeis, J., concurring)(free expression is necessary for both self-fulfillment and
good government); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1 970)(free expression
provides: (I) "a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment," (2) "an essential process for advanc-
ing knowledge and discovering truth," (3) a means of public decision making, and (4) "a method of
achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable community"); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrU-
TIONAL LAW 576-79 (1978)(free expression is an end in itself as well as a public right "central to the
workings of a tolerably responsive and responsible democracy").
Under the analysis proposed in this comment, the non-political purposes, while important, are
classified as "peripheral," as distinguished from the "core" purpose-ensuring the means of a self-
governing democracy.
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John Milton was an early proponent of the view that a free press is
beneficial to the public, not just to the publisher. Opposing government
regulation of the press in an influential address to Parliament in 1644,
Milton stressed that no one is a proper arbiter of truth and falsity, but
rather each person is deemed capable of using reason to discern truth for
himself. 18 Democracy rests on this principle, but such a principle requires
for its fulfillment free access to information and opinion from all
sources. 19 Similarly, James Madison considered the right of the people to
express themselves freely on public issues to be the mainspring of suc-
cessful popular government: "the right of freely examining public char-
acters and measures, and of free communication among the people
thereon, . . . has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of
every other right. "20
The New York Times Court also quoted Justice Brandeis' "classic for-
mulation" 21 of the role of free debate on public issues in the government
established by the framers of the Constitution:
Those who won our independence believed . . . that public discussion
is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government. They recognized the risks to which all human insti-
tutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely
through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discour-
age thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repres-
sion breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and pro-
posed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they
eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form.
Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they
amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guar-
anteed. 22
Three major principles of democratic government are summed up in
the Brandeis opinion:
(1) Open discussion of public issues is essential to a vital democratic
republic.
(2) Although abuses of free speech and free press are inevitable, sup-
pression is the wrong remedy.
18. J. MILTON, Areopagitica, in 4 WORKS 293, 309-10(1931).
19. Id. at 343-46.
20. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 274 (quoting Madison, Report on the Virginia
Resolutions, in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITuTION 554 (2d ed. J. Elliot 1836)).
21. 376U.S.at270.
22. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927)(Brandeis, J.. joined by Holmes. J..
concurring).
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(3) The proper remedy for wrongful speech is more speech. We rely on
the power of reason to sort true from false. "Sunlight is the most power-
ful of all disinfectants. "23
Thus, it is primarily for the benefit of the public that the first amend-
ment attempts to secure "the widest possible dissemination of informa-
tion from diverse and antagonistic sources." 24 The theory that the first
amendment protects a public interest in free debate is consistent with the
view of Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, 25 whose influence is apparent
throughout the New York Times opinion. 26
Meiklejohn observed that the language of the Constitution's protection
for the first amendment freedoms of speech, press, and assembly is abso-
lute, as contrasted with its protection for life, liberty, and property under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 27 Neither Congress nor the states28
can abridge first amendment freedoms even by "due process of law."
This prohibition limits the power not only of the legislature but also of the
judiciary. 29 The reason for this absolute protection, Meiklejohn asserted,
can be deduced from the central meaning of the Constitution itself: "All
constitutional authority to govern the people of the United States belongs
to the people themselves, acting as members of a corporate body poli-
tic." 30 The people are the governors as well as the governed. 31 By refus-
ing to government the power to abridge the freedoms of speech, press,
and assembly, the Constitution protects the means by which citizens may
exercise their power, right, and duty of self-government. 32 The principle
23. Statement of Justice Brandeis, quoted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 305
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
24. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266 (quoting Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
25. Meiklejohn, though not a lawyer, was an influential writer on first amendment issues. See,
e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960);
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment IsAn Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245.
26. See Brennan, supra note 16, at 10-20; Bloustein, supra note 17.
27. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 25, at 8-9, 52-53.
28. The first amendment binds the states through the fourteenth amendment. Stromberg v. Cali-
fornia, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
29. "What a state may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise
beyond the reach of its civil law of libel." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277
(1964)(footnote omitted).
30. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245,253.
The proposition that constitutional authority to govern the people derived from the people them-
selves is a central theme of The Federalist Papers. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton)
152 (Mentor ed. 1961). Chief Justice Marshall relied on this proposition in McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 wheat.) 316, 403-05 (1819).
31. Meiklejohn, supra note 30, at 253-54.
32. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 25, at 35-38.
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that government should not inhibit the flow of information and opinion on
matters relating to public policy is axiomatic in a self-governing polity. 33
To summarize, the first amendment's core purpose is to protect the
public's right to hear what others have to say on matters of public interest.
By prohibiting government from interfering with the dissemination of po-
litically relevant information and opinion, the free speech and free press
clauses provide for open "political discussion to the end that government
may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be ob-
tained by lawful means. . . ."34 An informed citizenry collectively rea-
soning its way to public policy is at the head of the body politic envi-
sioned by the framers, and they amended the Constitution to safeguard
democracy's life-blood-freely circulating fact and opinion concerning
public issues.
II. FROM NEW YORK TIMES TO GERTZ
Fearing that the specter of large libel judgments would induce a timid
self-censorship in those who might otherwise "give voice to public criti-
cism," 35 the New York Times Court employed a purposive analysis and
fashioned a privilege to protect speech concerning the official conduct of
public officials.
Three years later, concurring in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 36 Chief
Justice Warren built on the New York Times view that the free speech
clause limits defamation actions when they inhibit discussion of subjects
in which the public has a substantial interest. 37 He refused to limit the
New York Times privilege to the official conduct of public officials be-
cause political power is exercised in both the private and governmental
sectors: "Many who do not hold public office at the moment are never-
theless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions
33. Id. at 42. See also T. EMERSON, supra note 17, at 7.
34. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)(quoting Stromberg v. Califor-
nia, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)).
35. Id. at 278.
36. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Butts and its companion case, Associated Press v. Walker. involved
plaintiffs who were not public officials but public figures. Butts, a football coach, alleged he had been
defamed by a magazine article stating he had fixed a game with the University of Alabama. Walker, a
former general who had been a prominent opponent of the civil rights movement, challenged a news
report stating that he had led a violent crowd in opposition to the enrollment of a black student at the
University of Mississippi. The Court unanimously reversed the judgment for Walker and by a 5-4
vote affirmed the judgment for Butts. Id. at 162. The Court was split three ways as to the proper rule
to govern public figure cases. See note 39 infra.
37. 388 U.S. at 162-70 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Although Chief Justice Warren's was only a
concurring opinion, I focus on it because subsequent cases have made his proposed rule-public
figures must prove "actual malice"--settled doctrine. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323,342(1974).
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or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at
large." 38 Because the opinions and actions of public figures with respect
to public issues affect us all, Chief Justice Warren thought it appropriate
to expand the New York Times privilege to cover discussion of public
figures as well as public officials. 39 He did not attempt a precise definition
of a public figure, but he characterized one generally as a person who
plays "an influential role in ordering society" 40 and who, in most cases,
will have access to the media, which enables him "both to influence pol-
icy and to counter criticism .... ,,41
The expansion of the New York Times privilege to cover discussion of
matters in which the public has a substantial interest regardless of the
plaintiff's status could have been completed in Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, Inc.42 In Rosenbloom, the Court squarely addressed the question
whether a private plaintiff must prove "actual malice" if he was defamed
while the defendant was discussing a matter of public interest. Justice
Brennan, however, could muster only a plurality43 to agree that the New
York Times privilege should not depend on the plaintiff's status in a sub-
sequent suit for defamation, but rather should extend to discussion of
matters of public or general interest.
Justice Brennan did not want to freeze the growth of the law by defin-
ing matters of public interest narrowly or precisely. 44 The matter at issue
38. 388 U.S. at 164.
39. Id. at 163-65. Only Justices Brennan and White agreed with the Chief Justice that the New
York Times privilege should apply equally to public figures and public officials. Id. at 172. Justice
Harlan-joined by Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas-suggested a standard of fault less rigorous
than "actual malice": "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at 155.
In formulating a standard of fault that would accommodate both freedom of expression and protection
of reputation, Justice Harlan employed a balancing analysis. Id. at 147-55.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, maintained that the New York Times privilege was insuf-
ficient to protect "the press from being destroyed by libel judgments." Id. at 171. Only an absolute
privilege would suffice. Id.
40. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
41. Id.
42. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). During a police campaign to enforce obscenity laws, a Philadelphia
radio station broadcast news that the police seized 3000 "obscene" books from Rosenbloom. Fol-
lowing Rosenbloom's acquittal on criminal obscenity charges, he filed a libel suit. The jury returned
a verdict for plaintiff and awarded $25,000 general damages and $725,000 punitive damages. The
trial court reduced the punitive damages to $250,000 on remittitur. Id. at 32-40.
43. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's plurality opinion. Id. at
30. Justices White and Black wrote separate opinions concurring in the judgment but disagreeing
with Justice Brennan's rationale. Justice White urged a narrower rationale limited to the facts of the
case. Id. at 57-62. Justice Black reiterated his absolutist view that the first amendment does not
permit libel judgments against the media even if the plaintiff can prove actual malice. Id. at 57.
Justices Marshall, Stewart, and Harlan dissented. Their objections are discussed in notes 53-58 and
accompanying text infra. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration of the case.
44. 403 U.S. at 44-45.
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in Rosenbloom, a discussion of a police campaign to enforce Philadel-
phia's obscenity laws, was perforce decided to be within the public inter-
est. 45 Beyond that, Justice Brennan suggested that "matters bearing
broadly on issues of responsible government" 46 would be within the
scope of the public issue standard. While he would leave "delineation of
the reach of that term to future cases," 47 Justice Brennan left no doubt
that he would define "matters of public or general interest" expan-
sively. 48
Justice Brennan maintained that the free speech and free press clauses
protect uninhibited debate on public issues and that the protection should
not be vitiated as soon as a private individual becomes involved. 49 He
concluded: "We honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues,
which is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional
protection to all discussion and communication involving matters of pub-
lic or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are
famous or anonymous. " 50
Extension of the New York Times privilege to cover discussion of pub-
lic issues has been called "logical and inevitable." 51 Such extension is
indeed inevitable, if one assumes that, under New York Times and its
progeny, first amendment restrictions on defamation actions are deter-
mined by "the functions of the constitutional guarantees for freedom of
expression' '52 -by purposive analysis.
The Rosenbloom dissenters, who did not employ a purposive analysis,
raised two objections to extending the New York Times privilege to cover
discussion of public issues. First, such an expansion frustrates the law's
ability to provide redress for private individuals who have been injured by
wrongful publication. 53 Second, the dissenters predicted that the public
issue standard could lead to judicial censorship or press self-censorship. 54
Justice Marshall feared that the new test will require courts "to somehow
pass on the legitimacy of interest in a particular event or subject; what
information is relevant to self-government." 55 He concluded, "The dan-
45. Id. at 43.
46. Id. at 42.
47. Id. at 45.
48. Id. at41-42.
49. Id. at 40-43.
50. Id. at 43-44.
51. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 353 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
52. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41 (1971).
53. 403 U.S. at 66-70 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 79 (Marshall, J.. joined by Stewart. J.. dissent-
ing).
54. Id. at 62-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 78-82 (Marshall, J., joined by Stewart. J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 79 (citation omitted).
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ger such a doctrine portends for freedom of the press seems apparent. "56
Justice Harlan also forewarned of a possible threat to first amendment
values. He preferred rules of general application which would "preserve
a measure of order and predictability in the law . . . [and would] avoid
subjecting the press to judicial second-guessing of the newsworthiness of
each item they print." 57 Both dissents employed a balancing analysis. 58
III. THE GERTZ RULES
Because Justice Brennan's was only a plurality opinion, the law re-
mained unsettled. 59 Three years later, when the views of the Rosenbloom
dissenters commanded a majority, 60 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.61 re-
placed the public issue standard with a set of "broad rules of general ap-
plication. "62 The Gertz rules established the present accommodation be-
tween defamation law and the first amendment. Gertz divides defamation
plaintiffs into categories-public officials and public figures on the one
hand and private individuals on the other. Public figures and public offi-
cials must prove "actual malice" on the part of the defendant; that is, that
the defendant knew the statement was false or recklessly disregarded its
falsity. Private individuals need not prove "actual malice" unless re-
quired to do so as a matter of state law; they need only prove that the
defendant was at "fault.''63 The rules derive from a balancing analysis
and purport to accommodate conflicting values-the first amendment's
policy of protecting free debate and "[t]he legitimate state inter-
est . . . [in] the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on
them by defamatory falsehood." 64 Although the rules employ a threshold
56. Id.
57. Id. at 63.
58. Id.at63,81.
59. See Davis & Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974
DuKE L.J. 59.
60. Although he had voted with the Rosenbloom plurality and sensed "some illogic" in the Gertz
retrenchment, Justice Blackmun joined Justice Powell's opinion in order to create a majority. A de-
finitive ruling, he believed, would eliminate the uncertainty that had plagued the law of defamation
since New York Times. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 353-54 (1974) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
61. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
62. Id. at 343-44.
63. Id. at 342-47. Gertz extended the first amendment on the flanks by affording some measure
of constitutional protection from defamation liability to all speech, without regard to whether it in-
volves public figures, public officials, or matters of public interest. It did this by ruling that strict
liability in defamation is unconstitutional. In suits brought by private individuals, a state may define
its own standard of liability, but it may not impose "liability without fault." Id. at 347.
In addition, the Gertz Court ruled that the Constitution prevents states from allowing recovery of
punitive or presumed damages in the absence of proof of "actual malice." Id. at 349.
64. Id. at341.
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public issue test, the threshold is easily crossed and the status of the plain-
tiff is the determinative issue. 65
A. Public Officials and Public Figures
Public officials and public figures have not yet been defined with preci-
sion, but the Court has provided some guidelines as to who fits within the
categories. The category of public official does not include every public
employee, 66 but it does include all persons "who have, or appear to the
public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct
of governmental affairs. "67
Public figures are those who have assumed prominence in public life.
They may exercise such "power and influence that they are deemed pub-
lic figures for all purposes,' 68 or they may have "thrust themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the reso-
lution of the issues involved" 69 and, so, are deemed public figures for a
limited purpose. Except for the "exceedingly rare" involuntary public
figure, 70 public figures have sought attention. 7 1
B. Private Individuals
The Gertz Court considered fame to be a "compelling normative con-
sideration" which should underlie a distinction between public and pri-
vate individuals. 72 Because private individuals generally lack access to
the media, through which they can counter defamations, and because they
have not assumed the risk of injury caused by defamation, they are "not
65. Except in cases of the relatively rare public figure for all purposes, a threshold public issue
test continues to be applicable. Statements about public officials must be related to their official con-
duct and statements about public figures for a limited purpose must be related to the activities that led
to their classification as public figures. As applied by lower courts, this test is easily satisfied. See.
e.g., Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979)(health of a football
player); Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211 (Ind. App. 1978)(former Play-
boy centerfold linked to bribery case involving local police and a brothel); Carson v. Allied News
Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976)(tabloid newspaper stated that entertainer moved television show
from New York to California to be with his new woman friend, who in fact resided in New York).
66. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979)(dictum). Washington courts have
interpreted the public official category expansively. E.g., Clawson v. Longview Publ. Co., 91 Wn.
2d 408, 589 P.2d 1223 (1979)(administrator of county motor pool); Martonick v. Durkan, 23 Wn.
App. 47, 596 P.2d 1054 (1979)(clerk of the Washington State Senate). See generally Note. Libel-
Public Officials, 15 GONZ. L. REv. 575 (1980).
67. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
68. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,345 (1974).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 342.
72. Id. at 344.
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only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures,
they are also more deserving of recovery."73 Therefore, the rigorous re-
quirements of the New York Times privilege are inappropriate in cases
brought by private individuals. Concluding that the states can better bal-
ance the competing concerns of free expression and compensation for
defamation of private individuals, the Court held: "so long as they do not
impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defama-
tory falsehood injurious to a private individual.', 74
IV. THE FLAW IN THE GERTZ RULES-HUTCHINSON v.
PROXMIRE
Hutchinson v. Proxmire75 illustrates the inadequacy of the Gertz rules,
which allow, for cases brought by private individuals, an exception to the
rule that neither criminal nor civil sanctions may be imposed on a person
for good faith comment76 on a matter of public interest. 77
The case arose out of Senator William Proxmire's campaign to reduce
wasteful government spending. In order to publicize what he considered
to be egregious instances of such spending, Proxmire would periodically
announce that he had given a "Golden Fleece Award" to the culpable
department. In April 1975, the award went to three federal agencies 78 for
73. Id. at 345.
74. Id. at 347. The Court left open the proper resolution of a case involving defamation liability
arising out of a statement "whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of
its defamatory potential." Id. at 348.
Although some states have retained the Rosenbloom public issue standard, most have accepted the
opportunity offered by the Gertz Court and have made negligence the degree of fault necessary for
defamation liability. Collins & Drushal, The Reaction of the State Courts to Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 28 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 306, 312-14 (1978).
Washington decided to adopt negligence as the test for liability. Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co.,
86 Wn. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976). Justice Horowitz wrote a strong dissent urging retention of the
actual malice test when the statement concerned a matter of public interest. Id. at 456, 546 P.2d at
92. For a discussion of Taskett, see Note, Libel-New Standard ofLiabilityfor Media Defendants, 52
WASH. L. Rev. 975 (1977).
75. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
76. A good faith comment is one made by a speaker who believes it to be true and has no reason
to believe it to be false. In other words, a good faith comment is made without "actual malice."
77. The case was eventually settled. Senator Proxmire agreed to pay $10,000 in addition to mak-
ing an apology on the Senate floor. Wall St. J., Mar. 25, 1980, at 2, col. 3.
For additional commentary on the effect of Proxmire on the public figure category, see Rosen,
Media Lament-The Rise and Fall of Involuntary Public Figures, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 487,
502-18 (1980); Note, Wolston & Hutchinson, Changing Contours of the Public Figure Test, 13
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 179 (1979); Note, Libel Becomes Viable: The Narrow Application of Limited
Public Figure Status In Current Defamation Law, 7 OHIo N. L. Rev. 125 (1980).
78. The National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and
the Office of Naval Research. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 114.
Washington Law Review
their funding of Dr. Hutchinson's studies of the behavior patterns in ani-
mals aggravated by stressful stimuli.
In defense to Hutchinson's suit for defamation 79 and intentional inter-
ference in contractual relations, Proxmire moved for summary judgment
on two grounds: (1) he was immune to suit under the speech or debate
clause, and (2) his speech was privileged under the first amendment be-
cause Hutchinson was both a public official and a public figure. 80 The
trial court, agreeing with Proxmire on both grounds, granted his mo-
tion, 81 and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 82
The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that (1) the "informing
function"--sending press releases and newsletters-is not essential to
the legislative process and is, therefore, not within the limited scope of
the speech or debate clause83 and (2) plaintiff is not a public figure. 84
Both lower courts had found Hutchinson to be a public figure for the
limited purpose of comment on his receipt of public funds, because he
voluntarily applied for those funds and because he had access to the
media. 85 The Supreme Court rejected both reasons. Being a recipient of
government funds, the Court asserted, does not make one a public figure
for purposes of comment on public expenditures. To be a public figure,
Hutchinson would have had to assume a prominent role in the controversy
about government spending. 86 Hutchinson's access to the media prior to
the alleged libel was limited to journals for professionals concerned with
research in human behavior.87 The media reported Hutchinson's response
79. The text of Proxmire's speech announcing the award constituted the basis of the action. It
was incorporated into a press release and a newsletter to his constituents. It said in part:
Dr. Hutchinson's studies should make the taxpayers as well as his monkeys grind their teeth.
In fact, the good doctor has made a fortune from his monkeys and in the process made a monkey
out of the American taxpayer.
It is time for the Federal Government to get out of this "monkey business." In view of the
transparent worthlessness of Hutchinson's study of jaw-grinding and biting by angry or hard-
drinking monkeys, it is time we put a stop to the bite Hutchinson and the bureaucrats who fund
him have been taking of the taxpayer.
121 CONG. REc. 10803 (1975), quoted in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 116.
80. 443U.S.atl18.
81. 431F. Supp. 1311(W.D. Wis. 1977).
82. 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978). The appellate court did not decide whether Hutchinson was a
public official. Id. at 1035 n.14. The Supreme Court, therefore, did not address the question. 443
U.S. at 119 n.8.
83. The Court's construction of the speech or debate clause is outside the focus of this comment.
For a discussion of this aspect of the Proxmire case, see Supreme Court Review: 1978-79 Term, 7
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 316, 324-38 (1980); Case Comment, Legislative Immunity and Congressio-
nal Necessity, 68 GEo. L.J. 783 (1980); The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 60.
161-71 (1979).
84. 443 U.S. at 136.
85. Id. at 134.
86. Id. at 135.
87. Id.
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to the award, but this kind of after-the-fact access to the press was held to
be insufficient evidence on which to find that a plaintiff is a public fig-
ure.
88
In Gertz, access to the media for purposes of countering the defamation
by means of self-help was a justification for distinguishing between pri-
vate and public figures. 89 In Proxmire, the Court narrows the category of
public figure by requiring the defendant to show that the plaintiff had
"regular and continuing access to the media"9 0 -not merely sufficient
access to rebut the defamation by presenting his view of the controversy.
The Gertz rules, as applied in Proxmire, frustrate the first amendment's
central purpose: assuring the free discussion of political affairs. 91 Prox-
mire demonstrated how criticism of government may subject a speaker to
liability when the criticism implicates a person who is neither a public
official nor a public figure. To be sure, Proxmire's speech was intemper-
ate, but the free speech clause does not limit its protection to speech that
is moderate and in good taste. Flamboyant speech, invective, even speech
that causes injury to reputation may be sheltered by the free speech clause
and may be necessary to effective communication of ideas concerning
government. 92 Had first amendment protection been measured by the
public issue standard, Proxmire's newsletter and the public's ability to
read subsequent newsletters of the same sort would have been safegu-
arded.
V. THE PUBLIC ISSUE STANDARD RECONSIDERED
Because Senator Proxmire had little difficulty persuading the trial and
appellate courts that he was entitled to the New York Times privilege un-
der the Gertz rules, he had no reason to ask the Court to reconsider Gertz.
Even if he had adopted this dubious strategy, the Court was in no mood to
adopt the Rosenbloom public issue standard. 93 Nonetheless, the public
issue standard and the Gertz rules that replaced it deserve reexamination.
88. "[Tlhose charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by
making the claimant a public figure." Id.
89. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 344.
90. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 136.
91. The post-Gertz Court continues to acknowledge that safeguarding discussion of public issues
is an essential purpose of the first amendment. "Whatever differences may exist about interpretations
of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amend-
ment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978)(quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). See
also T. EMERsON, supra note 17, at 531-33.
92. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
93. Consider this expression of the current Court's view of Rosenbloom from a case argued and
decided on the same days as Proxmire-Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n:
A private individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming in-
Washington Law Review
A. Balancing Reputation Against Free Speech: A Proposed Analysis
Those who object to the public issue standard argue that it ignores the
reputational interest served by the law of defamation. 94 The Gertz Court
took the defamed party's interest into account, balancing the values pro-
tected by the free speech clause against the values protected by defama-
tion law. The Gertz majority reached a compromise between those com-
peting values. 95 But is it proper to compromise free speech? Does the first
amendment afford absolute or merely relative protection to the freedom
which is the foundation of our political system? Should the Court con-
sider interests that might be harmed by a person's exercise of his right of
free speech?
The appropriateness of a balancing analysis to decide first amendment
cases has been a subject of heated controversy. 96 The text of the first
amendment-" Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press" 97-suggests that balancing is not permissible.
Justice Black, a literalist who rejected balancing, relied on the text and
stated forthrightly, " 'no law' means no law.''98 Justice Douglas, al-
though not a literalist in matters of constitutional interpretation, also read
the command of the first amendment to be absolute. Objecting to the
Gertz accommodation of reputation and free speech, he declared: "no
'accommodation' of its freedoms can be 'proper' . . . .... 99 The absolut-
ist position has been a minority one, however, and the Court has often
volved in or associated with a matter that attracts public attention. To accept such reasoning
would in effect re-establish the doctrine advanced by the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc. [citation omitted], which concluded that the New York Times standard should
extend to defamatory falsehoods relating to private persons if the statements involved matters of
public or general concern. We repudiated this proposition in Gertz and in Firestone, however,
and we reject it again today.
443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979).
94. The Gertz Court stated:
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the
harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood, We would not lightly require the State to aban-
don this purpose, for, as MR. JUSTICE STEWART has reminded us, the individual's right to the
protection of his own good name
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity of every human being-a
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. "
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 341 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75. 92
(1966)(concurring opinion)).
95. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 341-48.
96. To get a feeling for the absolute-balancing controversy, see the law review articles cited in
note 5 supra.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
98. H. BLACK, ONE MAN'S STAND FOR FREEDOM 472 (1968).
99. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 356 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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used a balancing analysis in first amendment cases.100 By suggesting
when an absolute approach is proper and when balancing is proper, the
following section will try to resolve the conflict between the absolute lan-
guage of the first amendment and the Court's evident need in some cases
to weigh important competing interests against first amendment interests.
The proposed analysis distinguishes between the degree of protection
to be afforded speech within the core of the guarantee and speech on its
periphery. 101 At its core, the free speech clause protects speech necessary
for self-government, speech about matters of public interest.
[T]he central meaning of the free expression guarantee is that the body poli-
tic of this Nation shall be entitled to the communications necessary for self-
governance, and that to place restraints on the exercise of expression is to
deny the instrumental means required in order that the citizenry exercise that
ultimate sovereignty reposed in its collective judgment by the Constitu-
tion. 102
The protection afforded speech within this core should be absolute. Out-
side the core, the free speech clause affords a lesser degree of protection.
In this peripheral area it is proper for the Court to balance the values pro-
moted by the free speech clause-self-fulfillment through self-expres-
sion, 103 scientific inquiry,1O4 academic freedom, 10 5 the "market place of
100. E.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 834-42 (1978)(balanc-
ing the need for confidentiality of judicial disciplinary proceedings against the truthful reporting of a
matter of public interest); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961) (balancing freedom of
speech and association against the state's interest in requiring disclosure of Communist Party mem-
bership in bar admission proceedings); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143-49 (1943)
(balancing the community's interest in preserving repose against the right to knock on doors in order
to distribute literature). For a rejection of the balancing approach, see United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258,268 n.20 (1967).
101. The concept that a legal rule has a "core" or "central meaning" and a "penumbra" comes
from H.L.A. Hart's article, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv.
593, 615 (1958). I have preferred the word "periphery" to "penumbra" because a penumbra is a
place of mixed light and shadow surrounding a darker umbra. In legal analysis, the core would be a
center of illumination-not a center of darkness.
102. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,471 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) ("To permit the continued
building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are
guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship."); Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 576-79;
T. EMERSON, supra note 17, at 6.
104. See Delgado & Millen, God, Galileo, and Government: Toward Constitutional Protection
for Scientific Inquiry, 55 WASH. L. REv. 349 (1978). Cf. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
(statute prohibiting the teaching of 6,olutionary theory violates the freedom of religion provisions of
the first amendment).
105. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("Our Nation is
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and
not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amend-
ment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom"); Sweezy v.
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ideas"1 06-against other important social values. Speech about private
matters, deliberate lies, and speech made with reckless disregard of
falsity, since they are not within the core of speech necessary for self-
governance, need be given only relative protection. This core/periphery
analysis has the advantage of being faithful to the absolute language of
the text while at the same time providing the Court with the flexibility
necessary to protect peripheral first amendment values when those values
are not outweighed by other legitimate state interests.
This method of deciding whether to balance was suggested by a recent
opinion dealing, not with free expression, but with the fifth amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, New Jersey v. Por-
tash. 107 In Portash, the Court explicitly refused to balance the privilege
against any other interest because the testimony at issue was at the center
of the fifth amendment's protection against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion. The Court located the activity within the core of the constitutional
guarantee and then applied the amendment's absolute language rigor-
ously.108 Having decided the activity was at the center, the Court stated
that a balancing methodology would be improper. The Portash Court dis-
tinguished the absolute approach from the balancing approach it em-
ployed in cases involving violations of Miranda rights. Miranda warn-
ings are peripheral rights granted in order to protect the core privilege. ' 09
Analogizing from Portash, we can conclude that balancing is permissible
in cases involving peripheral rights, but not permissible if the right at
issue is at the core of an absolute guarantee.
The Gertz opinion did not distinguish between core and peripheral
speech and did not afford absolute protection to core speech. It afforded
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("Teachers and students must always remain free to
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die"). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (statute forbidding teach-
ing in schools in a foreign language violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
106. That free competition of ideas leads to the triumph of truth is a proposition that goes back at
least as far as Milton's Areopagitica. J. MILTON, supra note 18, at 347 ("And though all the windes
of doctrin were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licenc-
ing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falshood grapple; who ever knew Truth put
to the wors, in a free and open encounter").
Justice Holmes transported the locale of the competition from the battlefield to the marketplace in
one of his most famous dissents. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market .... ).
The "marketplace of ideas" concept has moved from the dissenter's side in Milton's and Holmes'
time to the majority's side in our own. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967) (academic freedom).
107. 440 U.S. 450(1979).
108. Id. at459.
109. See id. at 458-59.
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relative protection and balanced the value of providing a civil remedy for
wrongful injury to reputation against the value of speech about public
issues. Because they focus on the status of the plaintiff and not the subject
matter of the speech, the rules derived from the Gertz balancing lead to
the curious result that sanctions may be imposed on core speech while
intensive protection is afforded speech that does not further a central first
amendment purpose. 110
Proxmire exemplifies how the Gertz rules allow liability to be im-
posed on core speech when a public issue involves a private individual. I
Carson v. Allied News Co., 112 in which a report of an entertainer's sex
life was held to be protected by the New York Times privilege, illustrates
how the Gertz rules can afford inordinate protection to some speech that
is peripheral to the first amendment's central purpose. Similarly in Chuy
v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, "13 the court, finding Don Chuy, a
professional football player, to be a public figure, held that a statement by
the team doctor that Mr. Chuy was suffering from an incurable blood
disease was protected by the New York Times privilege.
Johnny Carson's sexual proclivities and Don Chuy's health are not
public issues; private scandal and gossip are not necessary for self-gov-
ernance and do not deserve the intensive protection of the New York
Times privilege. On the other hand, wasteful government spending is a
public issue, and Senator Proxmire's speech does deserve such protec-
tion. Core/periphery analysis would relegate publications like those at is-
sue in Carson and Chuy to the periphery of first amendment protection,
where a court could properly balance the public's interest in access to
such information against the plaintiffs interest in remedying a wrongful
injury to his reputation. And, core/periphery analysis would elevate a
publication like that at issue in Proxmire, one that makes a statement
about a public issue, to the protection afforded by the New York Times
privilege.
An additional objection to the accommodation of reputational con-
cerns, one not directly related to core/periphery analysis, is that the first
amendment's preferred remedy for false speech is not the suppression of
1I0. Justice Brennan anticipated this result. He warned that elevating the private-person/public-
person distinction to constitutional status "could easily produce the paradoxical result of dampening
discussion of issues of public or general concern because they happen to involve private citizens
while extending constitutional encouragement to discussion of aspects of the lives of 'public figures'
that are not in the area of public concern." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 364 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971)).




speech but "more speech." 114 The Gertz Court bowed to this principle
when it stated: "The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-
help--using available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the er-
ror and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation."" 5 But the
Court went on to speculate that private individuals, unlike public persons,
are likely to lack effective opportunities for rebuttal. 116 This may or may
not be true depending on the individual case, but it is beside the point.
The first amendment does not guarantee effective remedies for defama-
tion-it guarantees free speech and a free press. 117 The framers of the
Constitution envisioned that there would be abuses of free expression. 8
An inadequate remedy for defamatory speech is a price paid for living
under a Constitution that refuses both federal and state governments the
power to abridge the freedom to speak about public issues.
B. Protection for False Statements of Fact
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly employed this
core/periphery analysis in first amendment cases, an essential difference
between New York Times and Gertz can be highlighted by looking at
those cases from a core/periphery perspective.
Having located the speech at issue within "the central meaning of the
First Amendment" ' 19 (in the terms of this comment, the "core"), the
New York Times Court did not balance free speech against any other com-
peting interest. The Court expressly stated that neither defamatory con-
tent nor the presence of factual error supports the repression of speech
that would otherwise be free. ' 20 In contrast, the Gertz Court, prior to bal-
ancing, excluded false statements of fact from core constitutional protec-
tion.
[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the
intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest
114. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
115. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 344.
116. Id. It is doubtful whether Commissioner Sullivan thought he had an effective remedy
against The New York Times, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), or that
Johnny Carson's friend (later his wife) thought that she had an effective remedy against the National
Insider, Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
117. See Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding a state's right of
reply statute violates the free press clause).
118. "Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; and in no instance
is this more true than in that of the press." Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4
ELLIoT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (2d ed. J. Elliot 1836), cited in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271.
119. 376 U.S. at 273.
120. Id. at 271-73.
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in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues. New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., at 270. They belong to that category
of utterances which "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).121
In fact, the Gertz holding is less stringent than this dictum would lead one
to believe. Rather than affording no constitutional protection to false
statements, Gertz balanced competing values and afforded false state-
ments peripheral protection.
The Gertz Court's citation of New York Times should not obscure the
essential difference between the two cases on this point. New York Times
did not strip speech of core constitutional protection merely because the
speech was false. To the contrary, New York Times expressed the belief
that if public debate is to flourish, erroneous statements, which are inevit-
able in free debate, must be protected. 122 The New York Times Court ex-
pressly refused to make constitutional protection dependent on a "test of
truth-whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative offi-
cials. .... ''123
The New York Times Court was not unmindful of the probability that in
the realm of political debate free expression would be abused, reputations
harmed, and facts exaggerated; but the Court opined that free expression
on public issues is such an essential liberty that it should not be limited by
tests for truth or worries about reputation. 124
The Gertz Court focused on providing a remedy for injury to reputation
and ignored the question whether courts are the proper arbiters of the truth
or falsity of political speech. After the Court asserted that "there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact,"1 25 it proceeded to bal-
121. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 340.
122. 376 U.S. at 271-72. Accord, Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152 (1967);
[W]e have rejected, in prior cases involving materials and persons commanding justified and
important public interest, the argument that a finding of falsity alone should strip protections
from the publisher. [citation omitted] We have recognized "the inevitability of some error in the
situation presented in free debate," [citation omitted] and that "putting to the pre-existing preju-
dices of a jury the determination of what is 'true' may effectively institute a system of censor-
ship."
Professor Nimmer agrees that the content of dialogue on issues of public interest should not be
limited by a test of truth. Such a test, he believes, would effectively limit content of potentially
defamatory material to what an editor decides a jury would surely regard to be truth. If there is any
likelihood that a jury would find the statement to be untrue, only a courageous publisher would risk
defamation liability. Nimmer, supra note 5, at 950-51.
123. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271.
124. Id.
125. 418 U.S. at 340.
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ance the free expression values served by false statements against the re-
putational interests of varying classes of defamation plaintiffs. In the
terms of core/periphery analysis, Gertz relegated all false speech to the
periphery.
Because Gertz excludes false factual statements from core first amend-
ment protection, 126 it imposes, in effect, a test of truth which New York
Times considered so unwise. The question, then, becomes whether to
make core protection hinge on a test of truth as Gertz does or to adhere to
the New York Times position that determining the truth or falsity of a
statement about public issues is a question for the public at large and not
for judges or juries.
The Gertz Court's imposition of a test of truth poses dangers to free
debate. A single misstatement of fact can subject a speaker who can be
shown to be at fault to defamation liability. 127 Because erroneous state-
ments are "inevitable in free debate," such statements ought to be pro-
tected so that vigorous discussion of public issues will not be chilled by
circumspection. 128 Statements about public issues, unless made with "ac-
tual malice," 129 are at the core of the free speech and free press clauses,
and deserve protection without regard to whether a judge or jury subse-
quently finds a fact in the statement to be erroneous.
C. The Problem of Unpredictability: The Gertz Rules Versus the
Public Issue Standard
Justice Marshall's dissent to Justice Brennan's public issue standard
began with the observations that the standard was ill-defined and that un-
predictable application might lead to self-censorship. 130 Justice Brennan
admitted the indefiniteness of the standard, but he was willing to leave its
126. Id. at 339-40. See also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,457 (1976). where the Court
once again expressly excluded inaccurate and defamatory reports of facts from first amendment pro-
tection.
127. In some jurisdictions the defendant must prove that the truth was nearly identical to the
statement in order to sustain a successful affirmative defense of truth. -[I]f the accusation is one of
particular misconduct, such as stealing a watch from A, it is not enough to show a different offense,
even though it be a more serious one, such as stealing a clock from A, or six watches from B. " W.
PROSSER, supra note 8, at 798 (footnotes omitted).
128. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
129. Because statements made with "actual malice" are not inevitable in public debate and do
not further a central purpose of the first amendment, they need not be included within the core of first
amendment protection. On the other hand, fear of subsequent discovery and the burdens of litigating
the issue of "actual malice" may indeed chill the exercise of free speech. See Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153 (1979). It may therefore be wise to afford absolute protection to all speech about public
issues without regard to whether it was made with "actual malice." See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 293-305 (Black, J., and Goldberg, J., concurring).
130. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. at 78-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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delineation to future cases. 131 At its center, he made clear, the standard
embraces those matters necessary for the public to exercise its democratic
function of self-government, 132 what this comment has called core
speech. Justice Brennan's tentative characterization of what other types
of speech might be sheltered within the phrase "matters of public or gen-
eral interest" was so inclusive, however, that Justice Marshall was
moved to object, "all human events are arguably within the area of 'pub-
lic or general concern.' ",133 In retrospect, it is unfortunate that Justice
Brennan was inclined to be so exceedingly generous with first amendment
protection.
Core/periphery analysis suggests a compromise between Justice Bren-
nan's proposal and Justice Marshall's objection. If the public issue stan-
dard limited absolute protection to core speech, that is, speech necessary
for self-government, lower courts would have sufficient guidance so that
unpredictability could be minimized. Regrettably, Justice Brennan did
not so limit the public issue standard, and the Gertz majority, in an effort
to provide clearer guidance to lower courts, agreed with Justice Mar-
shall's Rosenbloom opinion that the better way to provide protection for
free expression was by means of "rules of general application." 134 Im-
plicit in the Gertz opinion is the belief that the rules could be easily and
uniformly applied, reducing the necessity for continuing Supreme Court
supervision of defamation litigation. 135
The persuasiveness of the Gertz view wilts under the light of the judici-
ary's experience with the Gertz rules. Distinguishing private from public
131. Id. at 44-45. Justice Brennan found the phrase "matter of public or general interest" in
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193,214 (1890). In defining the limits of
the right to privacy, the authors stated: "The right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of
matter which is of public or general interest." Id. Warren and Brandeis, like Justice Brennan, recog-
nized that the scope of this standard is indefinite, but indefinite standards are not unusual in the
common law tradition.
There are of course difficulties in applying such a rule; but they are inherent in the subject
matter, and are certainly no greater than those which exist in many other branches of the law,-
for instance, in that large class of cases in which the reasonableness or unreasonableness of an
act is made the test of liability.
Id.
132. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. at 41-43.
133. Id. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 343-44. For a discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of formal decision-making based on rules, see Powers, Formalism and Nonformalism
in Choice of LaivMethodology, 52 WASH. L. REv. 27, 28-32 (1976).
135. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 343-44.
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persons has not yielded predictable results. 136 As one beleaguered trial
judge complained, "[d]efining public figures is much like trying to nail a
jellyfish to the wall."1 37 Hence, the Gertz rules have not relieved the Su-
preme Court of the responsibility of supervising the constitutionality of
defamation litigation. 138
Admittedly, determining what speech is necessary to self-government
will not be a mechanical task that always yields predictable results. As the
common law process does its work of defining the standard on a case by
case basis, editorial caution will inevitably produce some press self-cen-
sorship, but less and less as the standard becomes clearer. Press self-cen-
sorship is a serious problem and will continue to be one as long as libel
actions are constitutional. 139 Nevertheless, under the public issue stan-
dard editors should have fewer fears that newsworthy stories will subject
them to defamation liability. Furthermore, on a theoretical ground, the
public issue standard is preferable to the Gertz rules because its scope is
coextensive with the speech the first amendment regards as most impor-
tant, speech necessary to self-government.
136. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. III (1979) (researcher on government contract) is far
from the only case in which lower courts have had difficulty in deciding whether a particular plaintiff
was a private individual or a public official or a public figure. E.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (Supreme Court reversed lower courts' finding that nephew of convicted
Soviet agents who had himself been convicted of contempt in connection with espionage prosecutions
was a public figure); Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978) (trial
court found physical education teacher to be both a public figure and a public official. appellate court
found him to be a private individual; state supreme court found him to be a public official). For a case
holding that a public high school teacher who selected a controversial book for class use is not a
public figure or public official, see Franklin v. Lodge 1108, Benevolent Protective Order of Elks. 97
Cal. App. 3d 915, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979).
Especially troubling are cases involving relatives or associates of public figures or public officials.
E.g., Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976) (girl friend, later wife, of television
celebrity held to be a public figure); Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (children
of executed spies are public figures despite attempting to preserve their privacy by changing their
name). It is somewhat difficult to reconcile such cases with either the assumption of the risk rationale
of Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45, or the purposive rationale expressed in New York Times, 376 U.S. at
269-71. See generally Note, Ai Analysis of the Distinction Between Public Figures and Private
Defamation Plaintiffs Applied to Relatives of Public Figures, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1131 (1976).
137. Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440,443 (S.D. Ga. 1976). See gener-
ally Bamberger, Public Figures and the Law of Libel: A Concept in Search of a Definition, 33 Bus.
LAW. 709, 711 (1978); Nat'l L.J., April 21, 1980, at 26, col 1.
138. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
139. See Gertz v- Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Curtis Publ.
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 171-72 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); Anderson, Libel and Press
Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422 (1975).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Limited to providing absolute protection to core speech, the public is-
sue standard would serve the first amendment better than do the Gertz
rules. By directing judicial inquiry to the subject matter of the speech
rather than to the status of the plaintiff, the public issue standard ensures
that no matter who is involved in the controversy, discussion of public
issues will enjoy the substantial constitutional protection of the New York
Times privilege.
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